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Clean Air: From The 1970 Act To The 1977
Amendments
Samuel Hays*
INTRODUCTION

Passage of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act' came after
seven years of intense experience with the workings of the 1970 law.
There was continual litigation, both to restrain and to enhance the
application of the former Act, the outcome of which established an
evolutionary tone. There was continual evaluation of the process of
implementation, and especially of enforcement, creating a changing
set of ideas about what would bring results and what would not.
Underlying this were both changing public values as to what objectives were desired in a clean air program and an evolving body of
information and concepts about the phenomenon of air pollution
itself. The significance of this debate was reflected in the intensity
of the three-year controversy over the amendments. Our purpose is
to provide an historical understanding of the manner by which the
program established by the Act of 1970 evolved into the amendments of 19772

From the point of view of those intimately involved in the workings of the Act of 1970, it established an extremely complex setting,
often difficult to grasp due to the sheer weight of detail. There were
stationary sources and mobile sources; different programs for the six
different criteria pollutants; old sources and new sources; and special provision for hazardous pollutants. There were responsibilities
for federal agencies and for state agencies. In addition, there were
the more technical details of emission inventories and air modeling,
* The author received a B.A. degree from Swarthmore College in 1948; a M.A. from Harvard University in 1949; and a Ph.D from Harvard University in 1953. He is presently a
Distinguished Service Professor of History at the University of Pittsburgh. This article is
adapted from a speech delivered by Professor Hays, March 1978, in a program entitled
Environmental Issues of the Pittsburgh Region - Clean Air Amendments in Western Pennsylvania, sponsored by the Carnegie Museum of Environmental History.
1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1977)).
2. For background to the 1970 Act, see, e.g., J. C. DAvIsS, I, THE PoLrrmcs oi PoLLLMON
(1970); J. C. Esposrro, VANISHING AI (1970); and R. H. K. Vietor, Environmental Politics of
the Coal Industry 240 (doc. diss., U. of Pitt., 1975).
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the calculation of credits for tall stacks, the assessment of the state
of technology to determine both what innovations might be brought
into being and what could not. Amid such details engineers began
to live in different worlds from lawyers,3 the sellers of pollutioncontrol equipment had to negotiate with buyers,4 and citizens who
sought to become involved in decision-making found ways and
means of influencing the program despite its complexities. 5
This world of complex detail, however, can be misleading. In
many respects the entire clean air program is extremely simple; and
it is important, as a starting point of analysis, to return to those
basics. The clean air effort consists of two elements: standards and
implementation. The identical issue is how clean the air should be.
Any environmental quality program involves a desire either to clean
up the air, water, or land, or to prevent its degradation. The problem lies in the degree of cleanness. To be effective, the general
concern must be translated into an operating procedure, a performance standard, an acceptable practice on the part of individuals,
corporations or government. Much of the debate has been, and continues to be, over that question. While, to the general public, a
standard represents a higher qualitative level of living, to the polluter it represents a cost which reduces both the profits of a private
corporation and the budgets of a public enterprise.
Standards constitute only the first step; the second step is implementation. How can the current circumstances be made more
desirable? How can a currently desirable condition be prevented
from becoming an undesirable one in the future? The effectiveness
of implementation reduces or maintains the standards. To hold to
the avowed level of quality is a constant challenge. Those whose
behavior implementation seeks to change will continually strive to
reduce the standards, to claim "overregulation," to argue that implementation goes beyond the intended objectives, to postpone, and
thereby to reduce, the impact of regulation. Implementation can
become less effective if it is open-ended, with a loose schedule for
producing results, or it can become highly controlled with a firm
3. Compare the technological perspective on air pollution problems which is found generally in J. AIR POLLUTION CoNT. A. and ENW'L. Sc. & TECH. with the legal perspective which
is found in ECOLOGY L.Q., ENVr'L. L., and EN'L. An'.
4. See G. B. Irwin, In Defense of the Vendors, 9 Evr'L. Sci. & TECH. 534-36 (June 1975).
5. See generally REPORTS OF NATAAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL AND RELEASES OF NATIONAL CLEAN AIR COALmON for information on citizen action in clean air issues.
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timetable accompanied by the requirement of intervening steps involving specific accomplishments. Despite all these complexities,
however, implementation is a simple problem of practical results.
This analysis outlines the major elements of the clean air program
in terms of their conceptual content rather than their complexity of
detail. We will attempt to avoid the tendency to recount the specifics of the law and its administration and will, instead, provide the
reader with some sense of balance and proportion in comprehending
the various ingredients of the program.
THE STANDARDS OF THE

ACT

The Clean Air Act of 1970 established a dual set of primary and
secondary standards.' Primary standards were built around the concept of protecting public health; secondary standards were intended
to protect a variety of social conditions, collectively known as
"public welfare," but more precisely outlined as the effects on materials, agricultural production, ecosystems and aesthetics such as
visibility. Thus the Act intended a wide range of effects to inform
the objectives of the air quality program, not confined to health
effects, but extending to many other adverse pollution problems.
There were to be minimum national standards established by federal authority which, in turn, would be implemented by state agencies.
Administration of the Act, however, resulted in a selective approach to this broad mandate. First, administrative decisions confined the application of the authority of the 1970 Act to six "criteria
pollutants"; 7 only under legal challenge from citizen groups did the
Environmental Protection Agency take steps to include other pollutants, the first of which was lead.' The 1977 amendments instruct
6. For a review of the Act of 1970 and its early implementation, see 4 EcoLOGY L.Q. 441
(1975), the entire issue of which is devoted to the subject. A manual detailing the workings
of the Act, from the viewpoint of potential citizen involvement, is J. CANoN, A CLEAR VImw
(1975).
7. The six criteria pollutants are: sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.11 (1976).
8. Action to force development of a lead standard was brought by the Natural Resources
Defense Council in 1971; on March 31, 1976, EPA listed lead as a criteria pollutant and
proceeded to develop a criteria document and standard. The sequence of events and the
controversies over formulation of the criteria document may be followed in 7 ENvm.
REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1361 (Jan. 14, 1977), 1486 (Feb. 4, 1977), 1962 (Apr. 22, 1977); 8
ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 274 (June 17, 1977), 409 (July 8, 1977), 929 (Oct. 14, 1977).
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EPA to consider four specific additional pollutants.' The history of
the federal clean air program indicates that the regulatory agency
was well aware of the desirability of a much broader perspective.
Under the preceding Act of 1967,10 which required the states to set
standards and to implement them, the federal National Air Pollution Control Administration commissioned a study by Litton Industries to decide which pollutants it should bring within its purview."
The 27-volume report, which covered the health effects of 30 pollutants, was submitted in September, 1969. It is apparent that
NAPCA contemplated issuing criteria documents for more than the
initial six, since it announced schedules for their appearance during
1969-1970. In establishing a program, however, the successor
agency, the EPA, did not take the initiative to expand coverage
beyond the six "criteria pollutants."
Also, the secondary standards have not been enforced so strictly
as the primary ones, especially in the case of sulfur dioxide. One
could argue that the entire clean air program has been influenced
overwhelmingly by health effects and, in the process of day-to-day
administration, agencies slowly drifted toward a preoccupation with
the correction of health problems to justify an action. One of the
first major judicial decisions involved a challenge by the smelting
industry to the secondary sulfur dioxide annual average standards.
The case was remanded by the court to the EPA for further consideration, and it has never reemerged.'" Visibility as a specific element
of an aesthetic air quality standard was not taken seriously by EPA.
It did appear in a number of state programs, and the 1977 amendments explicitly incorporated visibility into the federal program for
most national parks and wilderness areas.' 3 Thus, the 1977 amendA brief summary of the issues from an environmental viewpoint is contained in H. L. NEEDLEMAN & S. PIOMELLI, THE EFFEcrs oF Low LEVEL LEAD ExPosuRE (1978).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422(a) (Supp. 1977). The statute lists: "radioactive pollutants (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material), cadmium, arsenic and
polycyclic organic matter. . . ." Id.
10. An excellent account of the climate of change between these two acts is contained in
House Comm. of Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, H.
R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1077.
11. See Eseosrro, supra note 2, at 162, for events surrounding the Litton reports.
12. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
13. The relevant section is 42 U.S.C.A. § 7491 (Supp. 1977). National Park Service analysis of visibility in parks in southern Utah, as affected by existing and proposed generating
plants, helped to focus the concern for this provision. See U. S. DEvr. OF THE INTEIOR,
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ments attempted to capture a broader spectrum of objectives in
standard setting, as originally outlined in the 1970 Act.
Third, some states established standards of maximum allowable
pollution levels which were lower than the federal standards. The
1970 Act permitted this for stationary sources, clearly indicating
that the federal levels were to be a minimum effort and that states
were not prohibited from setting them lower. Some states have done
so," and challenges by industry to such state discretion have been
rejected by the courts on a number of occasions. 5 Few states, however, have utilized this option. The Act of 1970 witnessed an intense
controversy concerning state discretion with respect to mobile
sources. Despite massive opposition from the automobile industry,
California waged a long and successful battle to secure authority to
establish allowable automobile emission levels lower than federal
levels." No other state has secured that option. The 1977 amend17
ments extended the alternative to other states as well.
State discretion in standard setting for the evolution of the clean
air program permits some experimentation beyond the federal minimal requirements. It would be easy for the federal program to become frozen into established patterns, thereby creating a barrier to
innovation. In fact, regulated industries tend to promote such rigidity. The clean air program, however, contains a dynamic element
of new experience, new knowledge and new public values. It is important to observe the degree to which administrative agencies either resist or incorporate these evolving circumstances external to
administration itself. There appears to be a natural tendency to do
things the old way and to resist the implications of innovations in
perspective. State freedom to innovate provides some countertendencies to this conservatism. Flexibility does not guarantee innovation, since states also need resources, such as a firm research base
NATIONAL PARK SERVIcE, ANALYSIS or KAnPARowrrz PowamatPLAr IMPACTs ON NATIONAL RCRIATION RESOURCE wrrH INTERIOR REvIEw CoMMENTS ATTACHED (March 1976).

14. The federal 24-hour standard for sulfur dioxide, for example, is 0.14 ppm. Several
states have standards in the range of 0.10 to 0.13 ppm, and seven states have standards below
0.10 ppm. These include Hawaii with 0.03 ppm, Colorado and California with 0.05 ppm,
Vermont with 0.06 ppm, Missouri with 0.07 ppm, and Maine and Georgia with 0.09 ppm.
15. The relevant section is 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(c) (Supp. 1977). This state authority was
contained in the 1967 Act and was upheld in Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. State of
Texas, 456 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
16. For a recent account of the California issue, see J. E. Kaim & E. Usmn, POLLuTON
AN Poucy (1978).

17.

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(c)(1) (Supp. 1977).
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to bolster legal argument to act independently. The California experience, however, is instructive. While the federal 24-hour particulate
standard is 260 ug/m3,'5 the California standard is 100 ug/m3. While
the federal 24-hour sulfur dioxide standard is .14 ppm,'9 the California standard is .05 ppm when both oxidant and particulate levels
are at the maximum 24-hour allowable.20 The regulated industries
may not appreciate such increasingly stringent standards since
these serve as examples which other states might be tempted to
follow.
A fourth aspect of the standards is whether or not they should go
beyond primary and secondary levels to the entire range of air quality in every area of the nation. This issue, in the form of the
"prevention of significant deterioration" (PSD) program, became
one of the most heated controversies in the years between 1970 and
1977. Environmental groups, led by the Sierra Club, argued that the
Act of 1970 required a program to prevent the deterioration of air
cleaner than the secondary standards.2 ' The issue was debated intensely during administrative rule-making in 1971 and, when no
instructions were provided to the states to establish a PSD program
in the guidelines, litigation ensued. The resulting court decision
upheld the environmentalists' argument and led to EPA regulations
and an explicit program spelled out in the 1977 amendments.22 The
most significant effect of all this was to extend the clean air program
from the cities to the entire countryside and to establish maximum
allowable levels of pollution in every area of the nation. While the
Act of 1970 limited the explicit standards to certain areas of the
country, the 1977 amendments extended them to all areas.
Standard setting under the 1970 Act required a rationale and a
data base to provide support for the chosen level. Thus, the health
standard must be based on information about health effects, to
determine the precise level of pollution beyond which adverse ef18. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7474 (Supp. 1977).
19. Id.
20. See note 14 supra.
21. For a good account of the early development of the "no significant deterioration"
program, as it was "nitially called, see T. M. Disselhort, Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 4
ECOLOGY L.Q. 739 (1975).
22. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972). For the EPA regulations, which were promulgated Dec. 5, 1974, see 40 C.F.R. § 62.21 (1974). For an analysis of
the PSD problem, see 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1181-1257. For an extensive review
with bibliographies, see A. C. Stern, Prevention of Significant Deterioration,27 J. oF THE Am
POLLUTION CoNT. A. 440 (1977).
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fects on human health occur. Similar information is required for
"welfare" effects, such as data about the effects on materials, crops
and visibility. The 1970 Act, following innovations in the former
Clean Air Act of 1963 and the Air Quality Act of 1967, provided for
the compilation of "criteria documents"-summaries of the available scientific information on air pollution effects. These were to
establish the basis upon which standards would be set, by first
determining the level of observable adverse effects and then reducing that level further by a "margin of safety" factor. For "welfare
effects," no such margin of safety was provided in calculating the
standard.Y
The initial point of controversy in standard setting arose from the
conclusions about environmental effects in the criteria documents.
If one wishes to protect health and can establish that adverse effects
cannot be observed lower than 360 micrograms per cubic meter of
particulates, then far less clean-up will be required than if those
adverse effects can be observed at 120 micrograms per cubic meter.
Debate over the summaries of research for health effects mounted
during the late 1960's. When the National Air Pollution Control
Administration developed the initial criteria document for sulfur
oxides early in 1967, the coal industry raised such intense protest
that in the 1967 law Congress directed the Administration to reexamine the evidence. 24 During the debate over the 1970 Act and the
ensuing standard setting for both old and new sources in 1971, many
industries testified concerning their conclusions about the scientific
data on health effects. The conclusions varied greatly, depending,
for the most part, on the degree to which clean-up would be required
in that particular industry.25
For a number of years, the original criteria documents remained
unmodified. At the same time, the Act of 1970 had stimulated an
extensive amount of scientific information far beyond that available
in the late 1960's, when the documents were formulated. As a result,
in 1976 the Air Quality Criteria Advisory Committee of the EPA
recommended that the documents be revised. A schedule was estab23. This was a major point at issue in the argument of the plaintiffs in the Kennecott
Copper Corp. challenge of the secondary sulfur dioxide standard. Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
24. Esposrro, supra note 2, at 280.
25. See Vietor, supra note 2. The American Mining Congress recommended a sulfur
dioxide annual average standard of 130 ug/m3; the American Petroleum Institute, 115 ug/m3;
and the American Smelting and Refining Company, 2-5 ppm.
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lished for all six "criteria pollutants," which initially involved com-

pletion of revision by the end of 1979. Later, the date was extended
to 1980.11 The amendments of 1977 establish a periodic schedule for
revision, and explicitly require that a nitrogen dioxide criteria document for short-term exposure be issued not later than six months
after enactment. In authorizing this revision, Congress was explicit
about the range of effects to be considered: "nitric and nitrous acids,
nitrites, nitrates, nitrosamines, and other carcinogenic and potentially carcinogenic derivatives of oxides of nitrogen."' 7
Controversy over the criteria documents and their conclusions is
not over. Perhaps it is just beginning. Revision now underway will
provide a major opportunity for all sides to the controversies, especially those wanting higher allowable contaminant levels and those
wanting lower, to reopen the issues fully. This controversy will be
even more intense precisely because all parties are far more aware
now of the critical importance of the summaries of the scientific
data and particularly because environmentalists are far better prepared to bring their case to bear on the evaluations of the scientific
evidence. The stakes are high for both improved environmental
quality, on the one hand, and costs to polluters, on the other. The
outcome of the wider debate over air quality programs rests, more
than anything else, on the outcome of the debates over the state of
scientific knowledge about environmental effects.
Some of the more generic controversies are ,significant. First is the
question of the admissible types of evidence. Are toxicological studies of effects of pollutants on animals acceptable grounds for drawing conclusions about effects on human life? Medical experts are
divided on this issue. Do epidemiological studies, complex statistical analyses of the relationship between the incidence of environmental pollutants and environmental effects, provide sufficient
basis for making judgments about the causal relationship between
the two? Some medical experts argue that the relationships are so
complex and impossibly confused that no sound conclusions can be
drawn; others argue that, in spite of this, the weight of the evidence
does establish an acceptable basis for action. Also, there are arguments over what populations should be taken into account in de26. See 6 ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1393 (Dec. 12, 1975), 1993 (Mar. 26, 1976); 7
ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 12 (May 7, 1976), 127 (May 28, 1976), 464 (July 16, 1976),
924 (Oct. 22, 1976).
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7408(c) (Supp. 1977).
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scribing health effects: the healthiest segment of mature adults or
the more susceptible groups, such as the very young, the very old,
and the chronically ill. Finally, there are arguments regarding the
actual quantitative relationships, such as that between the level of
lead in blood and the level in the ambient air.28
In such matters as these, medical experts' opinions range along a
spectrum. On one end are the "hard liners" who argue that conclusive proof of harm should be established before action is justifiable;
on the other are those "health protectionists" who argue that
"substantial risk" can be established when "conclusive proof of
harm" cannot, and that the purpose of environmental protection is
to reduce such risk. This range of opinion about the degree of proof
required before conclusions can be drawn is a rather common phenomenon among scientists and is not peculiar to environmental effects
analysis.21 It can be expected, therefore, that the controversies will
continue. As long as the public has differences of opinion about the
degree of environmental quality which is desirable, and scientists
disagree concerning the "degree of required proof" to justify different levels of regulation and control, the controversies will persist.
Deep debate over interpretation of health effects continues. Recently the steel industry, through the American Iron and Steel Institute, petitioned the federal courts to require EPA to revise the criteria document for particulates more rapidly than scheduled. 3 Underlying this action is the steel industry's own "criteria document"
about the environmental effects of particulates. It was drawn up by
eight British medical experts under the lead authorship of Dr. W.W.
Holland, Professor of Clinical Epidemiology and Social Medicine at
St. Thomas Hospital Medical School of London. 31 The Holland document discounts the reliability of both toxicological studies on animals and epidemiological analyses of chronic health effects as a
basis for drawing conclusions about human health effects and stan28. For controversies concerning workplace carcinogens, see 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977).
See also N. KARCH, Exucrr CITrmrA AND PRINCILE FoR IDzNTIwG CaW01oGENs,DECsION
MAKING IN THE E mroNsmNTAL PRoTEIoN AGENcY (NAS, Analytical Studies for the U. S.

Environmental Protection Agency, vol. Ha). For the lead relationship dispute, see 7 ElviM.
RE.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1486 (Feb. 4, 1977).
29. See J. P. Hills, Legal Decisions and Opinions in Pollution Cases, 10 ENWr'L. SC. &
TECH. 234 (1976).
30. 8 ENm. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1507 (Feb. 3, 1978).
31. W. W. Holland, Health Effects of Particulate Pollution: Reappraising the Evidence
(Preliminary) (Dec. 1, 1977) n.p.
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dards. It argues that the current particulate annual average standard of 75 ug/m3 can safely be doubled to 150 ug/m3. Such arguments do not go unchallenged in the environmental health and regulatory fields. For example, California's own criteria documents, supported by medical opinion in that state, take a very different tack.
The American Petroleum Institute has made a similar challenge of
the current oxidant standard.32 Challenges such as these will constitute a major, and critical, focal point of debate over the clean air
program in this phase of criteria document revision for a half-dozen
years to come and perhaps perennially thereafter.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

AcT

Action to implement the standards has provided equally intense
debate. In concept the implementation or control system anticipated by the 1970 Act was quite simple. First, there was the ambient
air standard, 33 a bench mark which established outer limits of air
contamination. Behind this was a source that emitted pollutants
which had to be controlled in order to improve air quality. Some
system had to be devised to relate emissions from the source to the
level of ambient air quality. That system turned out to be a process
of mathematical modeling which served as a predicting device.
Given a pattern of sources, with given levels of emissions, located
in given terrain and amid given wind speeds and direction, the
ambient air quality would be predictable. One could work backwards from ambient air quality to allowable emissions at the source.
Needless to say, this was very complex and provided opportunities for considerable choice, personal judgment and error in establishing an effective causal relationship. Because of this extensive
"grey area" for choice, in the 1970 Act some environmentalists had
preferred a direct emission limitation with prescribed technological
controls rather than the cumbersome attempt to relate emissions to
ambient levels; but their views were rejected.3 The initial calculations were based on limited knowledge of source emissions. As control plans evolved in the mid and late 1970's, more elaborate data
were developed. Many calculations distinguished between "point
32. 7 EyIa. RE.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1191 (Dec. 17, 1976), 1919 (Apr. 15, 1977), 1972
(Apr. 22, 1977); 8 ENviR. Rm.-Current Dev. (BNA) 11 (May 6, 1977).
33. 42.U.S.C.A. § 7409 (Supp. 1977).
34. See Esposrro, supra note 2, at 259.
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sources"-the larger emissions sources, and "area sources"-the
small and the more generalized such as wind-blown dust.- Even
after agreeing upon this data, much choice remained. For example,
what model should be utilized to establish the relationships? There
were a number of options, often varying with the weights given to
various factors such as unmeasurable sources, wind direction, and
terrain. Even if all could agree about the model itself, there was the
question of changes in the emission sources which might occur after
the initial inventory, including increases and decreases in the number of sources and in the kind and mix of fuels used which generated
varying emission levels.
Options also arose concerning the location in which ambient air
was to be measured. Traditionally such measurements were taken
in the vicinity of the source. In the Bay Area Pollution Control
District in California, for example, the relevant monitor was located
at the property line of the source at ground level; no more distant
measurements applied. In such circumstances sources were tempted
to develop techniques to diffuse pollution into the wider atmosphere
and to reduce its local impact, such as with a tall smokestack which
carried the air upward into the atmosphere, as much as 1000 feet,
to "disperse" it. "Dispersion enhancement" techniques were
adopted by electric utilities as a preferred "control system." This
led to vast discrepancies between the ambient standard and the
emission. In the case of the Bay Area Pollution Control District, the
Exxon oil refinery at Benecia emitted sulfur dioxide at a rate of 6000
ppm (24 hour average) when measurements at the property line at
ground level were 0.04 ppm; this placed the source in compliance.
The actual emissions were dispersed into the San Joaquin Valley to
the east, contributing two-thirds of the total sulfur dioxide load
there.36
Such practical difficulties as these, encountered in establishing a
firm control system for relating emissions to ambient air, with persistent opportunities for escaping control, increased the popularity
of a direct, technological standard which would prescribe the precise
technology to be required. This development was shaped heavily by
35. For a calculation of sulfur dioxide levels for eight urban air-quality maintenance areas
in Pennsylvania, with an emphasis on both point sources and area sources, see A Study of
Existing and Projected Sulfur Dioxide Levels in Pennsylvania-8AQMA's ENGINEERING-Scd.
(1977).
36. California Air Resources Bd., 9 Bull. 1, 5 (Jan. 1978).
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the debate over intermittent controls for power plants, involving the
use of tall stacks. The EPA argued that the law permitted it to
require new technologies, such as flue gas scrubbers, to remove sulfur oxides, while the industry maintained that the law permitted
dispersion by means of tall stacks. Court decisions persistently favored the EPA interpretation,3 7 and in the 1977 amendments the
language was changed to prevent ambiguity. It required all new
sources to establish the "best technological system of continuous
emission reduction," thereby defining control systems in terms of
technology rather than of "meeting the standard.""
The gradual specification of controls in terms of technology was
much akin to the same tendency which had occurred in water pollution control. Over a decade of experience emphasizing ambient
water quality had brought out the vast difficulties in relating specific water discharges to general water quality. Consequently, the
Clean Water Act of 1972 had specified technological standards: the
first stage was described as the "best practicable technology" and
the second as the "best available technology." Such an approach in
air quality gave rise to a number of terms, such as "best available
control technology," or "lowest achievable emission rate," each of
which represented an attempt to spell out technological controls
more precisely. The precision was not always achieved, as one set
of terms became confused with another; but the general drift toward
technology standards as the most effective means of source controls
persisted.
To be effective, the conceptual control system just described had
to be translated into an administrative control system. Some administrative strategies had to be devised in order to establish a
regulatory process. In the first instance, this had two elements.
First, each state had to develop a "state implementation plan"
(SIP) which established the administrative rationale by which the
federal standards, or more stringent state standards, would be
achieved. The federal EPA would approve or disapprove the SIP on
the grounds of whether or not it would enable the standards to be
met. The specific control system involved a mixture of orders, reviews and permits, varying with each state. Usually a variance system was established whereby a source could secure permission not
37. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975); Big Rivers Elec. Corp.
v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975); NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974).
38. See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 1261-62.
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to meet the emission level in the prescribed time in exchange for an
agreement to meet a given set of conditions in a more extended
timetable.
Such a regulatory scheme set in motion a vast amount of legal
action which brought enforcement squarely into the courts. If a
polluter did not comply with the conditions of the permit, or with
the terms of a variance, enforcement action could be brought. Often
the initial stage of enforcement action led to an impasse in the
courts; polluters argued that the needed technology was not
"available" while the agencies argued that it was. Left in the middle
of such controversies, courts frequently supervised an agreement
between the contending parties which emerged in the form of a
consent decree or a court order. Such action, however, did not guarantee compliance. Often, especially in the case of industries in
which cleanup was more difficult, it only set off another round of
lack of compliance, enforcement action and litigation.
By the mid-1970's many from the enforcement agencies and the
active environmental public began to argue that the courts were
used merely to stall pollution abatement, that litigation was, in
fact, less expensive than the cost of implementing controls and that
some device should be developed in order to make the regulatory
process more direct and effective. Economists had long argued that
the major focus of regulation should be a tax, such as an emissions
fee, to internalize the social costs of pollution. 9 Such a proposal was
made by President Nixon at one point and was quickly withdrawn.
An economic penalty of a different sort, the noncompliance penalty,
was incorporated into the 1977 amendments. The theory behind it
was that if polluters did not clean up by the specified compliance
date, they would be permitted to continue, without legal action
taken against them, but with a fine, imposed daily, equal to the cost
advantage for not. complying. This, it was argued, would substitute
a direct economic penalty for lengthy litigation; but such arguments
did not clarify how the details of such a fee, its specific level and
rationale, could themselves escape prolonged court action. 0
Despite all these mechanisms for implementation of the desired
39. A major center for the dissemination of such a view was Resources for the Future. See,
e.g., CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POuCY (1978).
40. See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1150-51. Support for an emissions charge was
expressed by a variety of sources such as the national Academy of Sciences-National Academy of Engineering and the Committee for Economic Development. Id.
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levels of air quality, the primary focus of the program was to stimulate a more socially desirable technology. Existing technology had
social impacts which were considered to be socially undesirable.
Shifts to more acceptable technologies did not seem to come
through private market action alone; therefore, some sort of public
action was deemed essential. In the midst of the details of enforcement, participants often lost sight of the fact that the major thrust
of the 1970 Act was "technology forcing."" It was easy to argue that
technology was "available" or that it was not, and to focus on some
stage of technological development as the critical point in whether
or not it was. The legal questions surrounding such debates often
obscured the most important point: how can public action be taken
to stimulate the development of technology which was not yet in
place?
The public sector has available a considerable number of options
to achieve that objective. Such techniques have been used for decades, even centuries; and they should be brought alongside each
other for comparative analysis, in order to focus on the major technological thrust of the Clean Air Act. The nuclear power industry,
for example, was promoted by direct public investment; it would be
equally possible for the federal government to build and operate a
prototype coke oven or electric utility for the precise purpose of
developing and demonstrating new technologies. The role of the
Tennessee Valley Authority innovation in electrical transmission to
rural areas is a classic case. Many environmentalists wondered why
the TVA, as a publicily-owned utility, could not play a similar role
in creating a cleaner coal-burning technology. By the time of the
Carter administration and the appointment of S. David Freeman to
the TVA Board, it appeared that such an opportunity was at hand.
The major means utilized by the Clean Air Act of 1970 to stimulate new technology was the guaranteed market. Firm compliance
dates for installation of pollution-control equipment-flue gas
scrubbers, for example, established a firm market for potential
manufacture of that technology. With such a guarantee, capital
risks would be undertaken by enterprising engineering firms. The
economic incentive in such an arrangement lay not with either the
regulator or the regulated, but with the third party, the manufactur41. See J. E. Bonine, The Evolution of "Technology-Forcing" in the CleanAir Act, ENvm.
REP.-Monograph 21 (July 25, 1975).
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ers of the control equipment. The success of the technology-forcing
mechanism of the guaranteed market would lie in the degree to
which it stimulated innovation. If one followed the course of the
history of member firms of the Industrial Gas Cleaning Institute,
which represented industrial air-cleaning industries, one could
readily conclude that the market-stimulating mechanisms of the
Act had worked. 2 EPA developed close relationships with such
firms in order actively to stimulate the new technologies.
Technological innovation depended upon the commitment of installing firms to meet compliance schedules and to work cooperatively with equipment manufacturers to perfect it. Some did and
some did not. Some utilities, for example, established unusual contractual terms for the purchase of equipment, requiring guarantees
for unusually long trouble-free performance, and relatively high levels of consequential damages." Installation of flue-gas scrubbers by
utilities often depended upon their willingness to employ chemical
engineers who could deal with the attendant chemical problems in
an industry long dominated by other technical expertise. Once commitments had been made to investment in one form of environmental control technique, considerable additional incentive arose for
alternative suppliers to develop new techniques to lower the cost.
The initial step of willingness to comply developed quickly into an
even more powerful incentive-cost reduction-once commitment
to control had been made. Problems such as these emphasized the
degree to which a direct approach to technological innovation became more important as the air-quality program evolved.
The focus on new technology took on even sharper emphasis as
the timetable for urban cleanup was not met and the question arose
regarding whether or not new sources would be allowed in such areas
which had not yet attained the primary air quality standards. By
1976 this was known as the "nonattainment" problem, and considerable debate ensued over the options. The issue was forced by the
application for permits from new large sources in several cities such
as Pittsburgh, Houston, and Los Angeles. In each case, failure of old
sources to clean up made it difficult to justify the creation of new
42. S. Miller, The Business of Air Pollution Control, 7 ENvT'L. Sc. & TEcH. 988 (1973).
43. See R. E. Ayers, Enforcement of Air PollutionControls on Stationary Sources under
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 4 EcoLoGY L.Q. 445, n.11 (1975) (quoting from EPA,
Report of the Hearing Panel, National Public Hearings on Power Plant Compliance with
Sulfur Oxide Air Pollution Regulations, Jan. 1974).
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sources which would create backsliding in air quality by raising
allowable pollution levels. Lack of attainment of desired emission
levels by old sources restricted the growth of new industry. This
implication of the Clean Air Act of 1970 was sharpened as the federal EPA devised a policy both to permit such new sources and, at
the same time, to guarantee progress toward meeting the standards.
By 1977 the nonattainment problem became one of the major elements of debate over amendments to the Act. It placed sharp focus
on the need for technological innovation from both old and new
sources if economic growth in "dirty air areas" was to proceed.
INNOVATIONS

Although the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977 covered a wide
range of subjects, it is generally recognized that three constituted
the most extensive innovations from the 1970 Act: provisions for
prevention of significant deterioration, non-attainment, and delayed compliance penalties." Since the evolving circumstances
which gave rise to these provisions have been discussed above, we
will turn to their implications.
While in 1970 the prevention of significant deterioration occupied
a peripheral role in the Act, by 1977 it had come to play a central
part; this was one of the more dramatic changes in the context of
air-quality politics. During the 1960's federal officials responsible
for the air-quality program had committed themselves publicly to
a "nondegradation" policy. Such commitments had been repeated
in legislative committee reports during debate on the 1970 law;
however, few members of the public or of active environmental organizations had taken up the issue. In pressing the nondegradation
implications of the 1970 Act, and in carrying on the ensuing debate
which arose from this, the Sierra Club generated an active constituency that was much larger than before. Although some concern
for protecting clean air areas had existed previously, it certainly had
remained latent and was not activated until the issue was pressed.
By 1977 a significant political base for a "prevention of significant
deterioration" policy had developed.
As the issue evolved from a set of EPA regulations to explicit
legislation, the latter moved beyond even the former. EPA regula44. For the relevant sections of the statute, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7470-7491, 7501-7508,
7420(d) (Supp. 1977).
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tions had established a series of air quality classes-I, II and ImI.
Each would have permitted some deterioration of air quality-Class
I permitting the least and Class HI the most-up to the level of
secondary standards. Eventually, therefore, there would have been
two levels of air quality standards in addition to the primary and
secondary levels already in existence.45 EPA regulations, moreover,
established machinery in which all areas of the nation outside the
"nonattainment" areas would automatically be designated Class II;
each state had to set in motion machinery whereby, after extensive
procedural requirements, Class II areas could be redesignated either
Class I or Class III.
In three important respects environmentalists considered this
scheme to be flawed. First, no areas were declared to be mandatory
Class I areas, a limitation which, in the absence of state action,
could have excluded any area from being subject to the least
amount of deterioration. Second, Class III areas could deteriorate
to the level of secondary standards when, it was contended, they
should be required to fall short of that level, thus establishing a fivetiered system instead of the EPA four-level plan. Third, the EPA
regulations applied only to particulates and sulfur dioxide, not to
the remaining four criteria pollutants.4" The ensuing debate in Congress resulted in approval of all three of these principles, thus reflecting the enhanced degree of interest in PSD beyond the EPA
7
action as well as the 1970 Act.4
Closely connected with the legislatively mandated PSD program
was the equally innovative explicit protection of visibility in certain
park and wilderness areas. The amendments provided that the Secretary of the Interior designate the precise areas where visibility was
an important value and that states incorporate those designations
into their implementation plans." As discussed above, visibility had
been among the "welfare effects" covered by the secondary standards, but had received little subsequent attention. Concern increased, however, about visibility in the scenic areas of the west,
with special attention to the impact of coal-burning electric generating plants on both the Grand Canyon and the parks of southern
45. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.21 (1977).
46. See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1181-82.
47. See B. I. Raffle, The New Clean Air Act-Getting Clean and Staying Clean, ENVI.
REP.-Monograph 47 (May 19, 1978).
48. Id. at 17.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 17: 33

Utah. The National Park Service had taken up the issue of the
resulting destruction of scenic resources, and the drive for explicit
protection in the 1977 amendments was successful."
One important aspect of the PSD provisions was to limit an escape hatch which had permitted polluting sources to move from
more polluted to cleaner air areas. Heretofore there were few restrictions on such a move; air quality professionals had previously stated
that such action was desirable in order to enable polluting facilities
to move beyond the urban areas.5 The PSD provisions now placed
restrictions on this option. Especially significant was the procedure
adopted by EPA that implementation would require new sources,
even in nonattainment areas, to undergo review for their potential
impact on adjacent cleaner air areas. 5 The long-distance transmission of air pollution made it impossible to consider such sources in
isolation, within their own air quality region, and required impact
analyses on cleaner air areas at some distance. This type of analysis
was destined to bring a new perspective to air quality measurement,
control and evaluation throughout many areas not hitherto subject
to intensive air quality management.
The nonattainment provisions of the 1977 amendments had
equally significant implications. Most important was their implication that one had to think in terms of total pollution loads and not
just percentage reductions from given historic levels. Previously it
had been customary to think in terms of reductions from 1970 base
lines. There was general recognition that such reductions could be
more than offset by increases in the number of polluting sources and
that, at some future date, the more severe problem of constraints
in terms of total loads would have to be confronted. Initially, however, this was postponed. During the early years of implementation
of the 1970 Act, successful litigation by environmentalists resulted
in the requirement that EPA plan not only for reaching air quality
levels but also for maintaining them in the face of economic
growth. 52 The program was implemented by a number of less urban49. See note 13 supra.
50. See M. W. First, Process and System Control in Am POLLUTION 316 (A. C. Stern ed.
1968).
51. 8 ENvIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1109 (Nov. 25, 1977); see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(d)
(1977).
52. See NRDC v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See 38 Fed. Reg. 6279, 9599, 15,834
(1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 16,343, 25,330, 28,906 (1974); 40 Fed. Reg. 18,726, 23,746 (1975) for the
regulations.
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ized governmental units facing potential air deterioration from future growth, but it was generally ignored in the larger cities where
standards had not yet been reached and there were no primary
levels yet to maintain.
In these areas the issue of the impact of new sources was faced
by proposals for new industries amid nonattainment of the primary
standards. As the issue became more sharply etched, it defined the
air quality problem as one of finite air resources pressed by increasing quantities of pollution associated with economic growth. This
classic definition of ecological problems became clearer as the clean
air program evolved and especially as the nonattainment problem
became prominent.
The critical role of technological innovation in such nonattainment areas also became more sharply etched. If growth were to be
permitted, the level of cleanup from each source would have to be
greater than heretofore envisaged. Earlier the "best" technology
had been thought of as the "best available control technology" or
BACT; now the nonattainment policy defined "best" as the "lowest
achievable emission rate." The latter brought a wider range of comparisons into focus, enabling the administering agency to draw upon
technological examples from anywhere in the world to demonstrate
what was achievable. The model to be followed was not just what
could be "demonstrated" but what could be "achieved." Such a test
was not above controversy, but it constituted greater pressure for
technological improvement in order to forestall the need to limit
growth in the face of heavy pollution loads pressing against finite
air resources.
The nonattainment policy provided some innovative mechanisms
which could have rather extensive ramifications. A new source
would be permitted in a nonattainment area if the total combined
pollution from that and old sources were reduced over previous levels. Such allowable action envisaged the practice of new sources,
which would increase pollution, working out "trade-offs" with old
sources to reduce pollution even more, thereby permitting the new
source to be constructed. Actions taken to reach the requirements
of the state implementation plan would not be allowed as part of
the "credit" in such a trade-off, but reductions beyond that point
would. Hence, incentive would be built into the construction of new
sources which would encourage those who wanted to build new
plants to take private action to reduce pollution levels. One could
well envisage the purchase and sale of pollution "credits" and per-
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haps even the process of "banking" them to be used in the future.
This trade-off policy placed the entire burden of facilitating new
growth in a nonattainment area on those promoting that growth
when, in fact, the responsibility for restricting growth lay in the
failure of old sources to clean up. Should not the burden of action
fall on the old rather than the new source? Debate over this issue
during action on the 1977 amendments led to another approach
which would place more burden for creating allowable air quality
increments on old sources. It emphasized revision of the state implementation plans to provide for a "growth factor." Merely to meet
the standards, maximum air contamination levels would have to be
modified to include a margin for new growth in addition to the
standards. Responsibility for creating this cushion would fall on old
sources for whom cleanup would now have to be greater in order to
accommodate new growth.53 The approach was very similar to the
"growth factor" required in allocating water pollution waste loads
on water quality limited streams.
The delayed compliance penalty, the third of the major innovations of the 1977 amendments, arose out of the general concern for
program effectiveness. How could a regulatory scheme produce better results more rapidly? The focus on results generated a variety
of opinions as to what the problem was and what innovations should
be made. To many environmentalists and regulators, the main
problem was the way in which litigation provided an opportunity to
stall because it was cheaper than compliance. Their aim was to
reverse the advantage and to make litigation more costly than compliance. To economists, the problem was one of general rules applied to varied circumstances, resulting in wide variations in the
costs incurred by polluters as compared with the benefits. To them,
the source should first be confronted with a cost, such as a fee for
the "right" to pollute, and then be free to determine what action
should be taken to clean up in order to avoid the cost. To legislators
and regulators, one of the most severe problems in implementation
was equity. How to develop a program which would apply fairly and
equitably to all and would avoid the claim, with resulting litigation,
that one community or state, or one firm in an industrial category,
had an advantage over another. Finally, if one emphasized the
53. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Steelworkers Legislative Newsletter, Sept.
12, 1977, at 3-4 (attachment).
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larger problem of forcing a more desirable technology, then direct
technology requirements made sense irrespective of issues of litigation escape hatches, variable cost-benefit ratios, or equity in application. When the private market seemed too slow in generating and
diffusing desirable technology, did it not make sense to establish
public technology forcing programs across the board?
The 1977 amendments dealt with this problem in only a limited
way; in fact, debate over the amendments did not focus sharply on
these issues. For the most part, they emphasized the immediate
litigation problems of enforcement: how to end the interminable
round of agreements, failure to meet agreements, litigation, consent
orders, and further stalling, all apparently because such action was
less expensive than compliance? The answer was the noncompliance
penalty which permitted sources to go beyond the prescribed compliance data by paying a penalty equivalent to the economic advantage of noncompliance. This, it was hoped, would prod the more
recalcitrant sources into action. For the most part, this scheme
would give regulators more leverage in negotiating with polluters to
persuade them to install less polluting technology without delay. By
this scheme existing enforcement could produce the prescribed results more rapidly.
The focus on enforcement often obscured the major goal of technological innovation. The fundamental controversy over air quality
was one of developing new technologies. Private industry had failed
to bring about more socially desirable methods of production, thus
giving rise to public action to stimulate change. The most dramatic
expression of this concern lay in the continual emphasis, even
though relatively obscured from public view, on the development of
a pollution-free automobile, and the constant exasperation on all
sides about the slow pace with which private industry moved in this
direction. Public funding was provided for some innovations, but it
often appeared that efforts toward more pollution-free technologies
moved far too slowly. The air quality program did drive change
somewhat in this direction, such as fluid bed combustion which
could make possible a much cleaner method of burning coal. Even
more important was the hope that on-site solar energy systems,
and especially design of passive systems, solar collectors and
photovoltaic cells would generate a more "benign" process of
energy conversion and application.
While the 1977 amendments addressed themselves to more effective enforcement through the noncompliance penalty, they did not
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focus more precisely on the problem of technological innovation. In
this all-important aspect of air quality, one could detect only a
limited evolution of focused thought between the 1970 and 1977
acts.
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES

Thus far we have emphasized the legislative and administrative
evolution of the Clean Air acts. Underlying these more formal aspects of change, however, lay some significant developments in
perspective. Some of these arose from the realities encountered in
implementation, but others came from scientific inquiries which
took place in the 1970's. What was known in 1977 about air pollution, its creation, movement and effects, was vastly greater than
what was known in 1970. The impact of this new knowledge was
more a matter of redefinition of the problem than acquisition of firm
answers. One could well argue that by 1977 the conception of air
pollution as a problem had changed markedly since 1970 and that
such a change in perception had a profound influence on the course
of the politics of air quality. New realities and new perceptions of
problems exercised, in a subtle way, a controlling influence on the
evolution of programs and policies.
First was the emergence of cancer to take a more central role in
the health effects problem.54 Most of the discussion about air pollution in the 1960's, which provided the background of perspective in
which the 1970 Act was formulated, concerned the acute effects of
high-level episodes. "Disasters" were cited such as those in Donora,
London and in the Meuse Valley in France. The health effects of
these episodes usually emphasized deaths due to pulmonary or
cardiovascular diseases, or the worsening of such problems in susceptible populations. It was not surprising that one of the major
groups to become involved in the drive for clean air was the American Lung Association. It was around such problems that much of
the meaning of the term "environmental health" developed.
By the mid-1970's, however, the environmental causes of cancer
began to define the health effects of air pollution. It became ac54. See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1183-84. For current knowledge of low-level
pollutants, see H. R. SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ATMOSPHERE, COMM. ON
SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY, THE COTS AND EFFECTS OF CHRONIC EXPOSURE TO LOW-LEVEL POLLUTANTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (1975).
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cepted that 60%-90% of all cancers were environmentally caused.
The term "environment" in this case covered a wide range of circumstances, of which the most important was smoking, and probably 15% consisted of ambient air pollutants. The emphasis provided
a new focus for air pollution concerns. The "criteria" pollutants, as
well as additional hazardous airborne materials, might contribute
significantly to the growing incidence of cancer. One aspect involved
the components of particulates which heretofore had been subjected
to gross measurement. Analysis of particulates emphasized the importance of sulfates and nitrates as derivative pollutants. It also
stressed the much larger number of additional harmful chemicals
inherent in fossil fuel combustion, such as coal tars in general,
benzo-a-pyrene and trace metals. When isolated in experimental
situations, these could be identified as having distinctive adverse
health effects.
Environmental cancer effects first became prominent in the regulation of pesticides. The DDT issue, in the initial administrative
proceedings in Wisconsin, emphasized adverse effects on bird reproduction. 5 As pesticide regulation evolved, however, the potential
cancer effects on humans moved into the spotlight. A new emphasis
on similar effects of chemicals in the workplace also emerged by the
mid-1970's to generalize the cancer problem still further. Epidemiological work by Dr. Irving Selikoff in asbestos exposure played
an especially important role in extending this perspective. By 1977
the Occupational Health and Safety Administration had evolved a
generic policy on carcinogens through which it hoped to deal with a
broad range of potential carcinogenic substances in the workplace."
Late in 1977 the Environmental Defense Fund petitioned the EPA
to apply the same approach to hazardous air pollutants. Although
the Act of 1970 had contemplated action on this front, the EPA
sought to regulate few such ambient air pollutants."7 The EDF petition brought cancer effects back to a significant role in air pollution
policy.
55. See Thomas R. Dunlap, Publicity, Environmental Law, and DDT (paper presented
at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians in Atlanta, Ga. (Apr. 7, 1977)).
56. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977).
57. Environmental Defense Fund, Petition for the Initiation of Rulemaking Proceedings
to Establish a Policy Governing the Classification and Regulation of Carcinogenic Air Pollutants Under the Clean Air Act (Nov. 4, 1977). See also EDF, Testimony of the Environmental
Defense Fund at a Public Meeting to Solicit Recommendations Useful in Developing a Comprehensive Program for the Regulation of Carcinogenic Air Pollutants (Mar. 23, 1978).
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An equally important new perspective began to emerge as the
combined effects of two or more pollutants-their "synergistic effects" were investigated.5 8 The 1970 Act program envisaged separate
controls for six separate criteria pollutants;" but as new knowledge
accumulated, it became clear that this did not accurately reflect the
way in which effects occurred. The combined impact of two pollutants acting together was often greater than either one singly. Adverse effects of one in conjunction with another could be observed
at levels lower than with the one by itself. Such synergistic effects
could be observed most clearly in laboratory situations where exposures to plants. and animals could be controlled. They were more
difficult to determine in the case of human life not subject to experiments. Yet it was generally accepted that air pollution involved
exposure to many substances in combination. This recognition led
some to hope that epidemiological studies could be advanced to
measure the total impact of exposure to varied human populations."
If one were inclined to accept the importance of "welfare effects"
on crop production or the validity of experimentation on laboratory
animals as a basis for drawing conclusions about human life, then
the experimental data would become increasingly impressive.
Ozone was found to enhance the effects of sulfur dioxide in crops
and food plants; some triple combinations, such as ozone, sulfur
dioxide and particulates, were found to be operative. It was difficult
to know how to specify such effects precisely, yet increasing knowledge about them convinced many that the effects analysis of the
initial criteria documents might not be sufficiently stringent rather
than the reverse. In California it gave rise to standards more stringent than the federal." Knowledge about synergistic relationships
would profoundly affect the way in which air pollution impacts were
viewed and, even in the absence of precise information, would tend
to make judgments about allowable levels more conservative.
Even more profound was the increasing knowledge about long
distance transmission of pollutants and their transformation into
chemical forms that might be even more harmful. 2 Scientific data
58.
59.
60.
Report
61.
62.

See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1197-98.
See note 7 supra.
See the introductory remarks in EPA, Health Consequences of Sulfur Oxides: A
from CHESS, 1970-1971, No. 650/1-74-004 (May 1974).
See California Study, Staff Report, Vegetarian Effects 49 (Mar. 15, 1977).
See EPA, Position Paper on Regulation of Atmospheric Sulfates, No. 450/2-75-007
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emphasized the creation of derivatives of the criteria pollutants in
the atmosphere. This included transformation of sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide into sulfates, sulfuric acid, nitrates, nitrites and nitric acid, and a range of results, especially ozone, derived from
photochemical reaction with hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides.
These brought into focus new types of health effects. Sulfur dioxide,
for example, was recognized as harmful to human life not in itself,
but from its transformation into sulfates and sulfuric acid mists.
Similar effects occur with nitrogen compounds. The first of these to
receive explicit attention was sulfates. By the end of 1977 California
had adopted a sulfate standard and the EPA, prodded by environmentalist litigation, had such action under consideration."
The problem of transformation generated a new, regional, dimension to the definition of air pollution as a problem. Chemical derivatives, which formed during transmission in the air, produced effects
at great distances from the sources where their parent precursors
were generated. Whereas formerly air pollution was viewed as a
local problem, with primary emphasis on local fallout, new knowledge began to define it as a regional problem, often cutting far
across state lines and requiring coordinated regional control. Data
on the creation of ozone as wind currents moved from New York
City northeast across New England gave rise to a demand from
Massachusetts that some control be exercised on the source of the
problem in New York. By early 1978, litigation on this issue to force
New York City to control its oxidant precursors had been initiated.
An increasing amount of data defined the movement of wind currents from coal combustion sources in the Midwest, such as Illinois,
Ohio and Indiana, to the Middle Atlantic States and New England."4 Resulting acid precipitation had significant adverse impacts
on aquatic life in areas such as the Adirondacks. The phenomenon
(Sept. 1975);

HOUSE SUBcoMMrrrEE ON THE ENVmoNMmT AND THE ATMOSPHERE, COMMITrEE ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RELATED To SULFATES IN THE

ATMOSPHERE (1975); A. P. Altshuler, Regional Transport and Transformationof Sulfur Dioxide to Sulfates in the U S., 26 J. OF THE AIR PoLLrIoN CoNT. A. 318 (1976).
63. See California Air Resources Board, Research Division, Review of the 24-Hour Sulfate
Ambient Air Quality Standard, Staff Report No. 77-20-3 (Sept. 29, 1977).
64. See EPA, Office of Research and Development, Research Highlights, 1977, No. 600/977-044 (Dec. 1977); L. F. Smith and B. L. Niemann, The Ohio River Basin Energy Study:
The Future of Air Resources and Other Factors Affecting Energy Development (paper presented at the Third International Conference on Environmental Problems of the Extractive
Industries in Dayton, Ohio (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 1977)).
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of "acid rain" created a new problem perspective in air pollution
matters. 5
These new perspectives-the definition of health effects in
chronic, rather than acute, terms with emphasis on long-term accumulated impacts and especially cancer; the observation of the
greater effects from synergistic reactions; and the long-distance
transmission and transformation of pollution-had their complex
and their simple elements. One could argue that such new knowledge added complexity and confusion to an already confused situation and that little sound knowledge for action was available. Cutting through these details, however, were perspectives which defined a set of problems, each relatively simple in conception, which
exercised considerable power in how air quality problems were approached. Caution increased in allowing a higher level of pollution
as did a willingness to argue that standards might not be stringent
enough. Also, there arose a strong sense of the need to control pollution at the source rather than to permit it to disperse, thereby incurring the risks which expanding knowledge seemed to emphasize.
These new perspectives gave rise gradually to a growing conception of clean air as a source and limited resource. In 1970 clean air
had been thought of as a goal to be achieved. Pollution was the
problem, and a program was devised to reduce it. During the decade, however, a gradual shift in awareness took place: clean air was
viewed as something both valuable and finite. The constant pressures of pollution, in spite of efforts to clean up, gave rise to a more
protective stance, one which focused more on the air as a resource
to be defended against persistent intrusion. The fund of clean air
could not be expanded alongside the expansive potential of pollution. As that fact became more deeply etched into human consciousness, clean air as a finite resouce became the starting point in problem definition.
Thus, urban areas realized that if limited available clean air were
used for one purpose, it could not be used for another. If one source
polluted air, this preempted the available air and prevented use by
65.

See U. S.

DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNA-

ON Aci
PRECIPITATION AND THE FOREST ECOSYSTEM (General Technical
Report NE-23 (1976)). For international Canadian-United States implications of acid precipitation in North America, see R. LeBlanc, Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants, 27 J. OF
THE AIR POLLUTION CONT. A. 828 (1977).
66. See note 10 supra.
TIONAL SYMPOSIUM
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another. The finiteness of clean air itself constituted a limit on new
economic growth which depended on limited allowable levels of pollution. As pollution spread across the nation, even into nonurban
areas, a growing sense of the limited number of cleaner air areas in
the nation arose. Measurements by the mid-70's indicated that
while sulfur dioxide levels had been reduced in the cities, they had
remained more stable in areas beyond. Moreover, in the nonurban
areas, sulfate levels remained high. Ozone, the most ubiquitious
pollutant of all, pervaded the entire eastern part of the nation which
was declared, in its entirety, a nonattainment area for that pollutant. Such facts as these added incremental weight to the implicit
definition of air quality problems as the protection of a finite resource against invasion by pollution.
STRUGGLES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMENDMENTS

The most surprising aspect of the debate over the 1977 amendments was the strength of the environmental side of the controversy.
Witnesses to three years of intense struggle over the amendments
frequently attested to the heavy political resources brought to bear
by various economic groups to weaken the 1970 law. Yet at each
stage of the legislative process, firm counterforces were at work to
protect, and even strengthen, the Act. When it finally emerged from
the tortuous process, few serious inroads had been made in it; and
in some respects it had become stronger. In spite of the persistent
claims that environmental strength was at an ebb and had declined
since the 1970 Act, such was not the case. Although we cannot hope
to identify and explain this strength fully, it calls for some analysis
within the evolving political context.
As the drive for national air quality standards accelerated in the
late 1960's, industrial opposition to them, spearheaded by such
groups as the American Mining Congress, the National Coal Association, the American Petroleum Institute and the American Iron
and Steel Institute did so as well. 7 The 1970 Act was changed considerably in the final stages of legislation in the direction of a
stronger national program; this caught industrial opposition somewhat by surprise. This, in turn, generated a major counterattack
during 1971 as three rule-making processes under the Act took
67.

See Vietor, note 2 supra, at 292.
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place: ambient air quality standards, guidelines for states under
which they were to draw up implementation plans, and new source
performance standards. Input into these rulemaking processes by
industry was heavy. Industry took an especially strong stand on the
implementation guidelines and utilized successfully its informal relationships with the Department of Commerce, the Federal Power
Commission and the Office of Management and Budget in order to
thwart stronger federal leadership. It was especially successful in
weakening severely the guidelines to the states, one of which pertained to an anti-degradation program. Environmentalists were
able to defend both the ambient, and the new source performance
standards more effectively.
A major instrument of industrial influence in these early years of
the Act was the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, established by President Nixon and composed of representatives of
corporate firms and housed in the U.S. Department of Commerce."
While the Council (NIPCC) ostensibly served to provide useful information to the administration, in doing so it constituted a strategic political influence on policy. Often it and the Department of
Commerce, through which it spoke, were instruments of action at
the Office of Management and Budget and in interagency deliberations. Meetings of the Council were closed to the public, but its work
was financed by public funds. These two factors proved to be its
undoing. Environmental criticism of its work focused on the facts
of secrecy and finance. Finally, Representative John Dingell of
Michigan took the lead in a successful move to cut off funding and
eliminate it as a focal point of influence.
The attack on the 1970 Act from the industrial community continued at a persistent pace. It sought to influence public opinion by
emphasizing such themes as "overregulation" or "overkill," as the
term was widely used for a few years, and the loss of jobs, an argument which came to be prominent as industry sought active support
from labor. When it became clear that environmental regulations
led to the loss of few jobs and in fact created more than it eliminated, the arguments shifted to capital costs and inflation. In a
considerable number of court cases, industry took up a legal attack
on the Act which persisted throughout the decade, but with only
68. For accounts of the NIPCC, see G. J. C. SMITH, Ou ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 167-72 (1974);
Vietor, supra note 2, at 292-344.
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mixed results; up through the 1977 amendments the courts had
upheld the major elements of the 1970 law. The effort to discredit
the scientific basis for air quality regulations, begun in the late
1960's, continued through such actions as the attempt to undermine
the credibility of reports from the National Academy of Sciences69
and the widely debated CHESS report drawn up by EPA.70 Utilities
and the coal industry focused especially on the sulfur dioxide standard and the analysis of its health effects; they were increasingly
concerned with the new role of sulfates and long distance transmission on regulatory programs.
Despite these attacks, the environmental side, though greatly
outweighed in financial and technical resources, was able to organize sufficient strength to mobilize latent public support effectively
in the political debate. One crucial organization in this was the
Natural Resources Defense Council which emphasized litigation
and brought many of the environmental clean air cases. 7' These
were carefully selected to affect general problems of rulemaking and
administrative policy. The NRDC was the front line of environmental defense of the air quality program. Especially valuable to environmentalists was the expertise which evolved within NRDC with
respect to the complexities of administrative action and the scientific and technical aspects of air quality. By drawing experts into
the orbit of litigation, the environmental movement was able to
exercise significant leverage. By mobilizing such skills, litigation
organizations became centers of political strength which EPA and
other participants in air quality politics had to take into account in
69. See 5 ENvw. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1873 (Mar. 28, 1975) for an account of the
NAS report. To counteract the effects of this report, the Federal Energy Administration
contracted with Tabershaw/Cooper Associates, Rockville, Maryland, to do a similar evaluation, a draft of which was released almost simultaneously with the NAS report and was
entitled A Critical Evaluation of Current Research Regarding Health Criteria for Sulfur
Oxides. According to Frank Zarb, administrator of the FEA, the initial discussions on the
contract began in Nov. 1974; it was signed Feb. 5, 1975; the draft was completed Feb. 15,
1975. In discussions on the FEA report before the Senate Public Works Committee, Senator
Randolph suggested that it could be called a "tailored report." Zarb argued that both the
NAS and the Tabershaw/Cooper reports should be given "equal weight" in assessing health
effects. See 5 ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1871 (Mar. 28, 1975).
70. See 5 ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1888 (Mar. 28, 19/5), 2125 (Apr. 16, 1976); 7
ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 32 (May 14,1976), 285 (June 18, 1976), 496 (July 23, 1976).
71. See generally NRDC's Report; for NRDC input into the early 1971 proceedings, see
Letter from Richard E. Ayres to William D. Ruckelshaus, March 15, 1971, enclosing Comments on the Proposed National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards
(EPA Records Office, 1971 Air Pollution Standards Comments File).
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their daily decisions.
Equally important was the effort to mobilize political strength for
legislative revision. This came in the form of the Clean Air Coalition, Which brought together representatives of many environmental
organizations interested in clean air. Some of these were national
groups, such as Friends of the Earth, the American Lung Association and the Sierra Club; others were state and local groups, such
as New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water or the Los Angeles
Coalition for Clean Air. The Coalition organized the legislative defense of the Clean Air Act. It monitored the legislative process in
Washington, kept its member organizations informed regarding the
details of action, and mobilized citizens for input into each stage of
legislation. Equally important, in the battle for information, it was
able to ferret out technical data to influence the course of legislative
thought and action.
Especially valuable to the defense of the 1970 Act was the support
of groups which, although not integral parts of the Clean Air Coalition, worked in cooperation with it. While the Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers Union was a Coalition member, having formed
close ties with environmentalists on the common ground of protecting workers from pollutants in industry, other unions were not. Yet
during the debate over the Clean Air Act, organized labor threw its
weight in defense of the Act and against weakening it,"2 save for the
major exception of postponing the automobile standards. This role
reflected a failure by industry to win over labor fully to its side
except in a few selected issues. By 1977 many segments of organized
labor realized the adverse health impacts of polluted air at work and
attempted to maintain a balance in the twin drives for jobs and
clean air. On the jobs issue, they were drawn toward industrial
management; on the clean air issue, toward environmentalists.
Amid the intensity of the debate, they continued to maintain a
middle ground, but refused to budge on the basic principles of the
Clean Air Act. Even more surprising was the degree to which labor
supported the principle of prevention of significant deterioration,
not in itself a workplace issue. While organized labor was quite
willing to work out agreements for a cleanup timetable which might
extend beyond the previous requirements, it also insisted on prog72. See statement by John J. Sheehan, representative of the United Steelworkers of
America, 7 ENVIR. Rap.-Current Dev. (BNA) 240 (June 11, 1976).
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ress toward that end and was not willing to compromise the needed
regulatory systems.73
A critical aspect of the give-and-take of political struggle in the
evolution of the 1977 amendments was the role of the steel industry.
This was one of the major industrial groups which remained to
comply with the 1970 Act. Its slow progress was emphasized by a
rather dramatic session which took place at hearings conducted on
revision of the 1970 Act by the House Subcommittee on Health and
the Environment, chaired by Rep. Paul Rogers of Florida.7' At the
meeting were representatives of th3 American Iron and Steel Institute, in the person of corporate leaders of the largest steel firms in
the nation. Rep. Rogers asked each one, in turn, about the progress
made by his firm in meeting clean air requirements. Were any
sources in compliance? Each replied that, in fact, none were. The
expression of shock from Rep. Rogers was repeated on later occasions; the episode was described in the Report of the House Committee and continued to play an important role in the somewhat
negative attitudes toward the steel industry which persisted in Congress during enactment of the amendments.75
The United Steelworkers of America did not support industry in
its attempt to weaken the Clean Air Act. While it persistently spoke
of the need to protect jobs, it also refused to succumb to industry's
claims that, if the law were implemented, a massive loss in jobs
would result. Both labor and environmentalists referred to such
threats as "blackmail," and described them as management tactics
not in the interest of labor. On a variety of occasions, union representatives continued to maintain that environmental controls had
not been responsible for job losses and that reduction of steelworker
employment was due far more to new technology and increased
73. In the debate over the revision of the Clean Water Act during 1977, Lloyd McBride,
President of the United Steel Workers of America, wrote, "Our union does not seek any
congressional relaxation of the . . . EPA-OSHA regulations." See Letter from McBride to
Rep. Charles J. Carney, Chairman of the Congressional Steel Caucus, Oct. 19, 1977. During
debate over the "environment vs. jobs" referendum in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, in
the fall of 1977, USW representatives testified, "There is no evidence that changing the
environmental laws would preserve steel industry jobs." See statement issued on behalf of
Joseph Odorcich, Vice President of Administration, United Steelworkers of America, at a
press conference, Pittsburgh, Pa., Oct. 21, 1977.
74. H. R. SUBCOMMrrrEE ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, COMMrrrEE ON INTERSTATE AND

94th Cong., Clean Air Act Amendments-1975, at 690.
See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1289.

FOREIGN COMMERCE,

75.
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labor productivity."6 After the amendments were passed in 1977,
labor's own analysis of the Act's strengths and weaknesses was surprisingly similar to those made by environmentalists." While the
sfeelworkers were interested primarily in more healthful working
conditions, they maintained a broader view of the importance of the
clean air program in general.
The political struggle over the clean air program, as it evolved
between 1970 and 1977, demonstrated the critical importance of
scientific and technical capability as a key element of political
strength. Increasingly, many issues turned on the ability to bring to
the decision a convincing array of facts and arguments about the
effects of cleaner air. On this score industry had resources, such as
technical and legal staffs, which far outweighed those of environmentalists. The latter had to rely on studies conducted elsewhere,
in government and the universities, and on experts beyond their
own personnel who could be persuaded to join in the effort to protect
and extend air quality programs. Legal defense organizations at
times had a few "in-house" experts, but for the most part, few
resources to employ such skills were available. Staff members could
identify and utilize studies conducted elsewhere.
An emerging problem of extraordinary significance-the longdistance transmission and transformation of air pollutants-came
into prominence during the debate over the amendments and pinpointed the political significance of research resources. This issue
constituted a major example of the attempt to influence the direction of scientific inquiry. The problem was simple. Evidence was
accumulating that a number of pollutants were transported for long
distances, that in the process they were transformed into derivates
more harmful than their precursors, and that they "fell out" in areas
far distant from their place of origin. Neither EPA nor industry was
oblivious to the significance of this, and both rushed to undertake
studies of it. The electric utilities especially took up the challenge,
since one of the major problems was sulfates. The issue was joined
in one instance in the Ohio River Basin Energy Study, authorized
by EPA, which focused research on the long-range effects of sources
in the Ohio Valley. The utility industry objected to identification
of the problem as a major factor to be taken into account in analyz76.
77.

See note 73 supra.
See note 53 supra.
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ing the impact of the Valley's energy growth. 5 It seems apparent
that the "facts" about long-range transport and transformation of
air pollution would become the center of one of the most critical
political air quality struggles in the ensuing years.
It was equally apparent that the struggle over the "facts" about
health effects would be critical. The most immediate pending focus
for that controversy was the revision of both the criteria documents
and the standards. To industry it appeared that revision would
discredit the earlier standards; they were convinced that health
effects would be found to be far less severe than the earlier documents had concluded. To environmentalists, on the other hand, new
data with respect to almost every pollutant fully justified the standards and perhaps even lower maximum contaminant levels. A
major aspect of the anticipated struggle would be the balance in the
range of scientific expertise which would be called upon to approve
the criteria documents and the range of values which they expressed
in their judgments. To a large extent, the crux of the political struggle lay in that choice.
CONCLUSION

As one reviews the historical development of air quality policies
between the Acts of 1970 and the 1977 amendments, he is struck by
the rapid evolution of the context of policy-making. First there was
the persistent development of public values as reflected in the
"prevention of significant deterioration" program, the successful
litigation by environmentalists to supervise administration of the
Act, and the equally successful defense and extension of the Act in
the 1977 amendments. Those amendments were convincing evidence that the environmental movement, as it pertained to air quality, would not go away; they also helped to persuade environmentalists that they did reflect persistent public values and that they
could mount effective political programs.
Second, there was the remarkable evolution of ideas and perspective which came with the extension of knowledge about air pollution. By 1977 this could still be described as rudimentary in comparison with what was desired to be known; yet it was far more exten78. See news release, Ohio River Basin Energy Study (Feb. 15, 1978); see also response,
Sy A. Ali, Manager, Environmental Programs Public Service Company of Indiana, to Dr.
Boyd R. Keenan, Ohio River Basin Energy Study (Mar. 7, 1978).
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sive than what was known in 1970, and it established the contours
of perception and thought which would shape air quality politics for
the future. It was this perspective, arising from a far different
"cognitive map" about the nature of air quality, which made the
political setting of 1977 so vastly different from that of 1970. Much
of the success of the environmental thrust lay in the evolution of this
knowledge and its dissemination to the environmental public. The
continuing inquiries which were connected with this expansion of
knowledge set the stage for much of the politics of knowledge acquisition which constituted the focal point of struggles in the late 1970's.
Far less clear was the degree to which the debate over mechanisms of air quality control had led to significant changes. The move
to bolster regulation with a noncompliance fee and a stiffer civil
penalty authority was clear enough in the 1977 amendments. These
were experimental, though, and gave rise to no strong confidence
that they would lead to a new long-range context for air quality
policy. During the 1975-77 debates over revision of the Act, one
might well have looked for innovations in the technical context of
air quality control. How could more socially desirable technologies
be achieved more rapidly? There were a number of technical initiatives underway that appeared to be promising, and there were constant demands that private industry make greater progress toward
cleaner technology. Little of this came to constitute a focus for
national debate and vigorous policy initiatives.
The evolution of public debate over clean air from 1970 to 1977
reflected significant changes in public values and scientific perception, but technological perspectives lagged considerably. Perhaps it
gave rise to a fundamental question: while public policy can reflect
changes in public values to a considerable degree and can generate
new scientific knowledge though public funds, can it also create in
the private sector new and more socially desirable technologies?

